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resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the
disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagree-
ment point. Adding this function to the description of a bargaining problem,
a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the
agreement in the shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed
as the limit of a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a
function of the parties’ relative power in the disagreement scenario. As a result,
we identify a link between the circumstances of bargaining and the bargaining
powers within it.
Key words: Bargaining, conflict, disagreement. JEL Numbers: C78, D74.
«The rich get the law passed by means of force and arms or get it
accepted by fear to their might, aren’t things this way?» Plato, Republic.
1 Introduction
Standard bargaining theory arrives at solutions in two steps. The first step consists
in the reduction of a bargaining situation into the confines of a bargaining problem,
defined by Nash (1950) as the set S of feasible utility allocations and the threat point
d. The latter is meant to be the outcome of some (presumably) wasteful interaction
that follows disagreement. Thus, different “disagreement games” — reflecting altered
distributions of power among the players — are summarized as different threat points.
The second step — which has concentrated the efforts of bargaining theory proper so
far — consists in selecting a solution to this simplified problem. The solution to this
second step is based on either a set of plausible axioms or on the outcome of a posited
extensive-form game that is completely independent from the one which determines
the disagreement point. This game might admit differential bargaining power among
the agents, as in the generalized Nash solution. Our essential point is that current
bargaining theory establishes no link between the power of the players in the first step
— determining d — and in the second step, when fixing the shares of the surplus over
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and above d. Our paper is an attempt at integrating these two steps in a consistent
manner.
Specifically, we claim that the differential power of the players in the underlying
non-cooperative game supporting the disagreement point also influences the bargain-
ing process itself and, in fact, it actually determines its solution. In order to capture
the differential power in the non-cooperative game we need more information on the
disagreement game than just the equilibrium payoffs. We need a — reduced-form —
description of the disagreement game itself. As it turns out, all the relevant informa-
tion can be summarized by the specification of how the outcome of conflict, d, varies
as a function of the stakes, S. This is the — game-specific — disagreement function,
D(.), which maps sets of payoffs into the corresponding equilibrium of the disagree-
ment game.1 An extended bargaining problem is thus described by a pair (S,D(.)):
the set of the payoffs initially available and the disagreement function providing the
outcome of disagreement for any subset of these payoffs. We wish to stress that the
disagreement function is NOT freely chosen by the modeler, rather it forms part of
the description of a bargaining situation and, therefore, it is exogenously given. The
main contribution of this paper is to establish the connection between these hereto-
fore neglected conditions that “surround” the actual bargaining and the bargaining
solution itself.
The nature of the disagreement game depends on the problem at hand. In some
situations, it is so rudimentary that players do not even have a choice over alternative
strategies. Consider, for instance, bargaining over the price of an object in the middle
of a bazaar. If the players do not reach an agreement, the potential buyer walks out
1Note that this additional information was already required for the determination of d in the
standard context, since the knowledge of the game is necessary to find its equilibrium. Once the
game is well defined, it is straightforward to calculate its equilibria under different hypothetical
S
′ ⊆ S. As an example, consider the case when disagreement leads to, say, a Prisoners’ Dilemma
type game, where the payoffs are proportional to some simple function of S′, say the amount of
money at stake. Given the scale, all we need to know then, is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
basic Prisoners’ Dilemma game in order to generate the disagreement payoffs for any S′ ⊆ S.
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and goes to the next shop. Thus, the disagreement payoffs are simply the outside
options of the parties. However, such extremely simple situations seem the exception
rather than the rule. In the previous case, it is essential that players terminate any
future relationship after reaching disagreement. Whenever players do not cease to
interact, the disagreement game is necessarily richer. Social relationships are of this
type. The fact that we may fail to achieve a particular collective agreement simply
means that the future relationship among agents will be non-cooperative. The same
can be said of oligopolistic markets, industrial disputes, or simply of individuals liti-
gating over a particular issue of their concern. This is also the case in the international
arena, where one cannot modify who are one’s neighbors.
For our purposes, the only condition we need the disagreement game/function to
satisfy is that disagreement does not result in the loss of the entire surplus. That is,
either the surplus should not be fully relationship specific, or upon disagreement the
players should continue the interaction and reach a non-negotiated settlement which
does not destroy the full surplus. For this class of bargaining situations a simple
axiom — essentially positing individual rationality — permits the characterization of
a unique and efficient solution: the agreement in the shadow of conflict, or ASC.
The axiom of the Independence of Individually Irrational Alternatives, IIIA, simply
states that the agreement should not depend on the availability of alternatives that
are not individually rational — that is, they are dominated by the outcome of the
disagreement game for at least one player. This axiom, in principle, would not be
stronger than Nash’s axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (in fact, it
requires the solution’s independence of fewer alternatives), however, here it is applied
in the context of an extended bargaining game, what increases its bite (see below).
The key observation driving our result is that once we eliminate the individually
non-rational agreements, the bargaining problem becomes a different one — with a
new bargaining set reduced to the remainder. Via the disagreement function, the
new bargaining set yields a new threat point as well. Since our axiom applies to
all extended bargaining problems, it also applies to this new (continuation) one, and
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further reduces the set of feasible agreements. We show that the repeated application
of IIIA to the resulting sequence of bargaining games converges to a situation where
the disagreement outcome is efficient, thus pinpointing a unique solution.
To fix ideas, consider the simple example of splitting an inheritance of, say, ten
euros, between two siblings (who do not care for each other). The siblings can either
agree on a particular split at no cost, or disagree and engage in a costly dispute
over the money. Suppose that, if they engaged in conflict, in equilibrium seven euros
would be wasted (on, say, lawyers’ fees), while of the remaining three euros one
sibling would expect to obtain two and the other one. This allocation may reflect
the fact that, for instance, one’s lawyer is “twice” as influential as the other’s.2 As
a result of the expected outcome of conflict, any agreement must give to the siblings
at least two and one euros, respectively. Recognizing this, they are willing to get
to a partial agreement, which guarantees them these outside payoffs. Consequently,
the effective area of dissent shrinks to the remaining seven euros, which are precisely
the benefits from cooperation. On the division of these seven euros the siblings may
again either agree or disagree and engage in a dispute. In the dispute, say, four
euros would be wasted and the strong sibling would obtain two and the weak one.
Notice that even if they disagree, both siblings are better off by respecting their
partial agreement and restricting the dispute to the distribution of the seven euro
surplus. It thus follows that any agreement must give to the siblings at least four
and two euros, respectively. This observation generates a new partial agreement.
Applying the argument repeatedly, we reach the final agreement, where the ten euros
are distributed according to the power of the parties in the conflict game:3 20/3 and
10/3.
2For example, the expected division ruled by the court may be 7:3, but the cost of the better
lawyer is 5 while the cost of the worse one is only 2.
3In contrast, both the Nash (1950) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solutions would predict
that the seven-euro surplus over and above the (total) disagreement point would be brotherly shared
by the two players. They would obtain 5.5 and 4.5 euros in total, respectively.
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The argument above provides an attractive interpretation of negotiation as a
process4 where, driven by the fear of a conflictual resolution, the parties accept to
gradually narrow down the extent of their dissent.5 Along each step of this process, it
is the relative power of the players, as embodied in the disagreement function, what
shapes the solution. We prove that for a very rich class of games, perfectly informed,
rational agents will accept to reduce the area of their dissent completely: they will
reach an agreement.
We also clarify the connection between the ASC, the generalized Nash and the
Rubinstein solutions. Restricting attention to proportional disagreement functions
(what corresponds to fixed discount factors in the Rubinstein-type models) and to
a simplex as the Pareto frontier, we show that the ASC solution coincides with the
asymmetric Nash solution, where the ratio of bargaining weights is equal to the pro-
portion of the disagreement utilities.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the conceptual
forbearers of our approach. In Section 3 we develop our axiomatic theory of bargaining
in the shadow of conflict for general environments. We discuss the properties of
disagreement functions, present the IIIA axiom, characterize the bargaining solution
4This process may be an actual one or just a thought process, which directly leads the players to
agreement.
5Indeed, we observe that even in the cases in which players do not reach agreement and go
into playing the conflict game — think of the extreme case of wars — they do accept restricting
its amplitude. Thus, countries accept not to bomb civilian targets or to abstain from the use of
particularly harmful weapons. Likewise, plaintiffs may reach a partial pre-trial agreement still leaving
part of the dispute unresolved. What keeps the conflict from escalation is the separation between
the agreement and conflict games: not respecting a (partial) agreement is not a unilateral deviation
in the conflict game; instead it is a unilateral deviation provoking a transition to the conflict game.
This way such a deviation is observable: the countries foresee each other’s reaction to a unilateral
deviation. For example, according to our solution, in a complete information Cournot model, two
identical firms would each agree to produce half the monopoly quantity, which is indeed the optimal
colluding outcome (for them). The Nash equilibrium would correspond to unrestricted conflict (that
is, competition) in this case.
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and prove that it is unique. In Section 4 we provide an example for the disagreement
game. In Section 5 we analyze the linear model. Finally, we provide a discussion of
the related bargaining literature, followed by some concluding remarks.
2 Might and right in social agreements
The view we develop here is to a good extent inspired by Hobbes’ theory of social
agreements. Well before Economics developed the theory of bargaining, Political
Philosophy had addressed the question of social agreements in its inquiry about the
foundations of the state. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was possibly the first modern
political philosopher who formulated an articulated theory of the social contract.6 He
viewed the possibility of a collective agreement as a case of “conditional cooperation”
(in Taylor’s, 1987, words), constrained by what individuals can obtain in the state of
nature. The state of nature is the outcome that would ensue from a non-cooperative,
rule-free interaction among utility maximizing, selfish individuals (Hobbes’ first ax-
iom). The outcome of this interaction is resource consuming and is governed by the
differences in endowments across individuals. His second axiom asserts that there
exist agreements that Pareto dominate the allocation achieved under the state of na-
ture. Finally, according to his third axiom, agreements should be conditioned by the
allocation resulting in the state of nature: «. . . it is a precept, or generall rule of
Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre forth as he has hope of
obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and
advantages of Warre» (Leviathan, 100, as cited in Taylor, 1987, 131). Therefore, in
Hobbes’ view, social agreements are not the outcome of an idealistic introspection on
how things ought to be, but rather the viable outcome of a process conditioned by
the might of the parties.
That actual social agreements will, at least partly, reflect the distribution of power
is to be expected as long as a social contract is to be found acceptable by all parties.
6See Taylor (1987) and Gauthier (1990).
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Therefore, and this is one of Hobbes’ characteristic themes, we cannot develop a
theory of social contracts without reference to the power of the parties in the non-
cooperative scenario. The state of nature not only determines the size of the potential
surplus to be shared, but also the shares themselves.
It is our opinion that standard bargaining theory has been driven to the use of
normative axioms because the description of the bargaining problem was so stylized
that there were no bases left for a positive derivation of the corresponding agree-
ment.7 We develop a positive theory of agreements, adopting Hobbes’ position that
takes the initial conditions as given and focuses on reachable social agreements, quite
independently of the moral judgement they might deserve. We reserve normative
considerations for the “state of nature,” the initial conditions under which a par-
ticular agreement has been reached.8 This view is consistent with Roemer’s (1996)
reservations about the moral content of a bargaining agreement obtained without a
prior redistribution of the initial endowments.
We explore whether a solution can be characterized saving on axioms and making
a more intensive use of the information contained in the description of the background
game. This approach is in line with the growing literature on the explicit modeling
of the conflictual resolution of opposing interests. The works by Becker (1983) on
pressure groups and Tullock (1980) on rent-seeking, are the predecessors of the more
recent papers by Esteban and Ray (1999), Grossman (1991, 1994), Grossman and
Kim (1995), Hirshleifer (1991, 1995), Horowitz (1993), and Skaperdas (1992) among
7Svejnar (1986), Roemer (1988) and, more recently, Chen and Maskin (1999) have also expressed
their reservations about the standard description of a bargaining problem, pointing out that Nash’s
abstraction might be dispensing with essential information.
8Consider the parallel case of assigning the gains from exchange. Economics takes a positive
stand and investigates the terms of trade that will actually take place, resulting from different
market structures and characteristics of the traders. It does not inquire about which would have
been the “fair” terms of trade. The normative valuations are reserved for the comparison of the
distribution of the characteristics that condition the trade (distribution of endowments, for instance).
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many others.9 The common feature of all these models is that the opposition of
interests is resolved via conflict. Players expend resources into trying to make their
preferred option prevail. The equilibrium outcome entails waste of resources and
the particular allocation reached critically depends on what is at stake as well as on
the relative power, among other relevant characteristics, of the players. It seems only
natural to enquire why there is conflict to start with and whether there exist plausible
conflict-avoiding agreements in this scenario.
3 Agreements in the shadow of conflict
Suppose that there are N players, who wish to reach an agreement in S0 ∈ Σ, where
Σ is the set of non-empty, convex, compact subsets of the utility10 space, ℜN+ . In
case of disagreement, during any point of the negotiation, the payoffs are given by
(the solution11 to) a disagreement game played for the currently available stakes
(some subset of S0). Even though this game may be elaborate and may depend
on a number of parameters, for our purposes the only relevant information is the
relationship between the stakes and the outcome. Hence, we posit the existence of a
disagreement function, D(.), which assigns a disagreement point, d, to every S ∈ Σ,
(an therefore, to every non-empty, convex, compact subset of S0). That is, if the set
of alternatives currently considered were S, the outcome of disagreement would be
9Models of the conflictual resolution of opposing interests have also been developed in areas
such us growth, international trade, industrial organization, organizational design, patent races,
or economics of litigation, to mention just a few. Conflict models have also been developed for
boundedly rational individuals (see, for example, Anderson et al., 1998).
10Actually, for our analysis it is not necessary that preferences satisfy the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms. We could directly phrase our model in terms of money, prestige or the like.
We elaborate on this issue in the Conclusions.
11This solution maybe a unique Nash (subgame-perfect?) equilibrium, but uniqueness of equilib-
rium is not necessary. In case of multiplicity, the “disagreement outcome” can be defined as the
meet of the utility vectors gained at the different equilibria. In the next section we provide a family
of conflict games with unique equilibria.
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d = D(S) ∈ S.
It is important to stress that we need not impose any structure on D(.), since it
is meant to be a positive description of some real underlying conflict situation and,
therefore, it cannot be freely chosen by the modeler. D(.) may depend on additional
parameters, especially those related to the players’ “strength”, which form part of
the description of the conflict game.
A bargaining solution is a mapping, fD: Σ → Σ, satisfying fD(S) ⊆ S for all S
∈ Σ and D(.). That is, given D(.), the solution selects a non-empty, convex, compact
subset of the alternatives as acceptable.
Define Sx = {s ∈ S|s ≥ x}. That is, Sx is the subset of S which weakly Pareto
dominates x. Note that, if S ∈ Σ, then SD(S) ∈ Σ as well.
As long as players act rationally, any solution should weakly Pareto dominate the
disagreement outcome, since otherwise at least one player would prefer to provoke
disagreement. In other words, from the knowledge that players are rational we can
deduce that any agreement on S should be a member of the set Sd. Our only assump-
tion is that any eventual agreement on S should not be altered if we eliminate all the
alternatives that cannot be candidate solutions under individual rationality (i.e. the
complement of the set Sd in S).
We thus impose the following axiom on the bargaining solution:
Axiom 1 Independence of Individually Irrational Alternatives (IIIA):
fD(S) = fD(SD(S)) for all S ∈ Σ.
Imposed on a standard bargaining problem, IIIA would simply eliminate the al-
ternatives that do not weakly dominate the disagreement point. However, in our
context, IIIA has a recursive effect: once we eliminate the individually irrational al-
ternatives, the application of the disagreement function to the remaining set results,
in general, in a different disagreement point than before. Consequently, the axiom
applies again, eliminating further possible agreements. In fact, as long as D(S) is
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interior to S, the application of IIIA keeps generating new — smaller and smaller —
sets of acceptable agreements.
In view of its recursive implications, should we still find IIIA a plausible axiom?
We certainly think so. The point of all “irrelevant alternatives” type axioms is to pro-
vide some consistency between solutions of the same underlying bargaining situation
but with different sets of available agreements. In our view, the appropriate descrip-
tion of the bargaining situation should not be confined to a fixed disagreement point,
since the outcome of disagreement is likely to depend on the alternatives available.
Therefore, what should be kept fixed when carrying out the “consistency check” is the
disagreement function, just as it is done in IIIA. That is, our assumption compares
bargaining situations where the same set of players are bargaining in the shadow of
the same conflict game but with different sets of feasible utility payoffs.
Our first result shows that the requirement imposed on the solution is not too strin-
gent. To see this, for any S0 ∈ Σ, define the sequences, dt = D(St) and St+1 = Stdt ,
t = 0, 1, 2, .... Note that the sets St are non-empty, compact and nested. Therefore,
their intersection is uniquely defined and it is non-empty as well. Let us now consider
the bargaining solution f ∗D(S
0) =
∞⋂
t=0
St. This solution satisfies IIIA. To see this, take
any Ŝ0 ∈ Σ. We have that f ∗D(Ŝ
0) =
∞⋂
t=0
Ŝt. At the same time f ∗D(Ŝ
0
D(Ŝ0)
) =
∞⋂
t=1
Ŝt.
Since Ŝ0
D(Ŝ0)
⊆ Ŝ0,
∞⋂
t=0
Ŝt =
∞⋂
t=1
Ŝt and therefore f ∗D(Ŝ
0) = f ∗D(Ŝ
0
D(Ŝ0)
). We have thus
proven that
Lemma 1 For any D(.) there exists a bargaining solution consistent with IIIA.
A further nice property of bargaining solutions satisfying IIIA is that for any
bargaining set, the union of all solutions is itself a solution satisfying IIIA, and in
fact it is f ∗D(.), the solution displayed in the existence proof above.
Lemma 2 For any D(.) and for any S ∈ Σ, if fD(.) satisfies IIIA then fD(S) ⊆
f ∗D(S) ≡
∞⋂
t=0
St.
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Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then for some S0 ∈ Σ, fD(S
0) \f ∗D(S
0) is non-empty.
Then since limt→∞ S
t = f ∗D(S
0), for t large enough it must be the case that fD(S
0)
\St is non-empty. However, by IIIA, we have that fD(S
0) = fD(S
t) ⊆ St for all t.
Contradiction.
As a result of Lemma 2, we can meaningfully talk about f ∗D(.) as the “maximal”
solution satisfying IIIA.
We are now set for the formal definition of our solution concept.
Definition 1 The agreement in the shadow of conflict solution (ASCD(S
0)) is
∞⋂
t=0
St,
the maximal bargaining solution consistent with IIIA.
The increase in the informational content of the description of the bargaining
problem — together with our axiom — is sufficient to provide us with a unique set of
“acceptable” agreements. In general, this set of agreements needs not be a singleton.
Whether the predicted outcome is determinate or not, depends on the nature of the
disagreement game. We shall now prove that for disagreement games where at least
one of the players can obtain a payoff which is “noticeably” superior to the worst
possible agreement for them, the above result can be strengthened: the ASC solution
singles out a unique, Pareto efficient agreement.
Denote maxzi (z ∈ Sd|z−i = d−i) , the best payoff Player i can get if the rest of
the players stay at their status quo payoffs, by bi (Sd) . The formal requirement we
need to impose on the generalized bargaining problem, (S0,D(.)), in order to obtain
uniqueness, amounts to the following assumption.
Assumption 1 ∃ ǫ > 0 such that for all St, t = 1, 2, ..., Di (S
t) ≥ Di (S
t−1) +
ǫ (bi (S
t−1)−Di (S
t−1)) for some i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
The amount of information contained in the disagreement function depends on
whether the players can significantly affect the status quo. If they can’t, the disagree-
ment payoffs convey little, if any, information about the characteristics of the players,
so we should not be surprised if they do not pinpoint a unique solution. Assumption
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1 is satisfied by non-cooperative games in which there is at least one player that has
a choice over a set of possible strategies and that in equilibrium is not indifferent
about all of them. Examples of this class of games abound: in pre-trial bargaining
the lawyer’s fees are often set as a percentage of the amount under dispute; in collu-
sive agreements in a market setting, even if there is cut-throat Bertrand competition,
unless the firms are identical, there is always positive profits for the more efficient
firm; in conflict models with endogenous choice of effort there is usually a unique
interior Nash equilibrium, etc.12 Alternatively, if the surplus bargained over is not
fully relationship specific, some players must be better off “opting out” than with the
status quo, necessarily leading to a higher inside payoff.13
Just as with IIIA, we have to ask ourselves the question, whether Assumption 1
remains reasonable when used in a recursive context. The question boils down to
the interpretation of disagreement over a set, which Pareto dominates the status quo.
What do we mean by disagreement over a set, whose worse element gives the players
more utility than the status quo? We believe that this should be understood as a
partial agreement: the players agree to distribute some of the surplus in a certain way,
thereby reducing the set over which they disagree. As long as this partial agreement
is honored even in case of a later break-up, or conflict, the assumption is as valid as
when it is made about the original bargaining set.
We can now reap the benefits of Assumption 1:
Proposition 1 The ASC bargaining solution selects a unique — and therefore effi-
cient14 — agreement if the generalized bargaining problem satisfies Assumption 1.
12See the next section for an example.
13Note that the familiar case of bargaining over the price of an object to be traded, would appear
to violate Assumption 1, since the payoffs upon no trade are zero. However, note that in any realistic
application, the players are likely to have outside opportunities — ensuring a positive payoff relative
to the current status quo — bringing us back to the realm of Assumption 1.
14By construction, each set St contains the points of the weak Pareto frontier of S0 that dominate
D
(
St−1
)
. Therefore, the point S∗ is on the Pareto frontier of S0, proving the efficiency of the
solution.
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Proof. If ASCD(S
0) is a singleton, then by its maximality it is also unique. Assume
it is not a singleton. By Assumption 1, it must be the case that there exists a t high
enough, so that ASCD(S
0) =
∞⋂
k=0
Sk = St. But then, also by Assumption 1, as St is
not a singleton, St+1 = St. Contradiction. Therefore, St = ASCD(S
0) must be a
singleton.
Thus, we have shown that whenever the disagreement functions are informative,
a mild axiom about the players’ rationality is sufficient to identify a determinate
agreement. The essential point is that, by using more information on the player’s
characteristics, as revealed by the outcomes of the disagreement game, we can dispense
with most axioms, except rationality.
4 A model of conflict
It is perhaps useful to consider a concrete family of disagreement games. Esteban
and Ray (1999) show that for a generalized version of Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking
model (a probabilistic all-pay auction, which captures the idea of wasteful conflict
well), there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Suppose that there is a unit
of surplus, to be distributed between two players. If they fail to reach an agreement
they will play a (wasteful) non-cooperative game. To be specific, we shall consider
the case in which disagreement leads to a contest game, where the entire surplus is
allocated probabilistically to one of the contestants.
Let pi denote the probability that player i obtains the surplus. Individuals can
influence these win probabilities by contributing effort, ri. We make the standard
assumption that
pi =
σiri∑
j
σjrj
, (1)
where σi is the relative power of individual i, so that σ1 + σ2 = 1. Power can
be construed here as the party’s technology of converting effort into what actually
matters in the competition.
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Individual utility is assumed to be additively separable in consumption and effort.
It is linear in consumption and isoelastic in effort.
Thus, the expected utility Ui by player i will be
Ui = pi(ri, rj)−
1
α
rαi , i, j = 1, 2. (2)
Given the strategy of the other player, rj, the best response by player i is the
effort level ri that maximizes (2).
A Nash equilibrium of this contest game is a pair (ri, rj) such that each level of
effort is the best response to the effort contributed by the other agent.
Esteban and Ray (1999) show that as long as α > 2, this game has a unique
Nash equilibrium. Here, we assume that α > 2 indeed. That means, that we can
take that unique equilibrium as the predicted outcome of disagreement: the value the
disagreement function, mentioned in the Introduction, would take.
The first-order condition for a maximum can be written — after some minor ma-
nipulation — as
pipj = r
α
i i, j = 1, 2. (3)
This implies that in a Nash equilibrium ri = rj and hence, pi = σi. Computing the
equilibrium utilities, we have that
Ui = σi −
1
α
σiσj = σi
α− σj
α
. (4)
Adding over the two players we find that
U1 + U2 = 1−
2
α
σ1σ2. (5)
Therefore, under conflict only a proportion λ of the available money is saved, with
λ =
α− 2σ1σ2
α
, (6)
and it is distributed in shares
γi = σi
α− σj
α− 2σiσj
. (7)
Note that, unless one of the parties has all the might, 0 < λ < 1. Therefore,
Assumption 1 is satisfied.
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5 The linear case
In this section we restrict our attention to bargaining situations where the sub-
problems considered are affine transformations of the original one. In other words,
we assume that the bargaining set has a linear Pareto frontier (corresponding to risk
neutrality), and that the disagreement function is homogeneous. These simplifica-
tions render the calculation of ASC easy and it also facilitates its comparison with
other solutions.
Therefore, in this section we assume that S can be written as S =
{
s ≥ 0,
∑
i
βisi ≤ R
}
for some R > 0 and some β in the unit simplex.
We shall also focus on the class of disagreement functions that satisfy the following
property:
Assumption 2The disagreement function D(.) is homogeneous, that is, D (α+ λS) =
α+ λD (S) for all α ∈ ℜN+ and all λ > 0.
15
We can now easily compute the ASC solution.
Proposition 2 Let S0 =
{
s ≥ 0, 0 ≤
∑
i
βisi ≤ R
}
and let D(.) satisfy Assumptions
1 and 2. Then, the ASC solution satisfies
f ∗i (S
0, D)
f ∗j (S
0, D)
=
Di (S
0)
Dj (S0)
for i, j = 1, 2, ...,N.
Proof. We know that the solution is S∗ = limT→∞
T⋂
t=0
St, where St = {u ∈ St−1 | u ≥ dt−1} .
Therefore, to obtain S∗ we need only to compute d∗ = limt→∞ d
t . Note that any set
St in the sequence satisfies St = dt−1 + λtS0, with λt =
R−
∑
i
dt−1
i
R
. By Assumption
2 we have that dt = D (St) = dt−1 + λtD (S0). Therefore, dt = D (S0)
t∑
r=1
λr and the
equality in the statement of the Proposition follows immediately.
15It is easy to show that the contest model dicussed in the previous section, satisfies that D(λS) =
λD(S) whenever the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set is linear.
16
5.1 A comparison with the Nash Bargaining Solution
Note that while the ASC and the NBS are solutions to qualitatively different bar-
gaining problems, they still are just different ways of approximating how negotiations
would end up in a real life situations. Therefore, it is sensible to compare them when
the common elements (the bargaining set and the disagreement function evaluated at
the bargaining set) coincide. In order to illustrate the differences between the ASC
and the NBS, let us examine the case of splitting one euro. The disagreement game
is as follows. Whatever the amount of money at stake, x, a fraction β , 0 < β < 1, is
lost and of the remainder (1− β)x, a fraction αi goes to each player i = 1, . . . , N . It
is straightforward that the ASC solution is to give si = αi to each player. Clearly, αi
can be interpreted as the relative power of player i and β the degree of inefficiency
induced by playing the disagreement game. The ASC solution does not depend on β
because the sharing of the surplus of cooperation respects the power of the players as
reflected in the disagreement game.
The NBS instead allocates the euro as sNi = (1− β)αi+
β
N
. The Nash solution is
arrived at by combining the outcome of the disagreement game (biased by the power
of the players) and the brotherly sharing of the surplus on the basis of equal division.
Parameter β is now the weight assigned by the NBS to the equal sharing rule. The
more biased is the disagreement game, the greater is the discrepancy between the
Nash and ASC solutions.
Take now the construction of the NBS — that is, a part of the surplus is shared
in proportion to the disagreement payoffs and the remainder according to some other
sharing rule — but assume that the parameter β is not constrained to coincide with
the loss from conflict, rather it can be freely agreed among the players. It is easy
to see that the only situation in which the players would agree is when the “other”
sharing rule coincides with the one which is proportional to the disagreement payoffs,
resulting in the entire surplus being shared in those proportions (irrespective of β).
The example makes it clear that ASC is a solution based on the asymmetric
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treatment of the players. Thus, it is natural to explore the relationship between
ASC and asymmetric Nash solutions. Recall that the asymmetric Nash solution (see
Harsányi and Selten, 1972) results from the constrained maximization of a social
welfare function where the individual welfare weights are supposed to embody the
differential (bargaining) power of the players: W (x, d) =
N∏
i=1
(xi − di)
γ
i. We shall
now discuss the relationship between the vector γ and the power of the parties as
embodied in the disagreement function.
Recall that the asymmetric Nash solution can be characterized as the point on
the Pareto frontier where the pair-wise elasticity of this frontier is equal to the corre-
sponding ratio of the bargaining weights.
We then have the following:
Proposition 3 When the Pareto frontier of S is the unit simplex and the disagree-
ment function satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, the bargaining weights corresponding to
the ASC solution are γi = Di (S) , i = 1, 2.
Proof. When the Pareto frontier is the unit simplex, the marginal rate of substitution
is 1, everywhere. Consequently the elasticity of the Pareto frontier is equal at every
point to the ratio of the utilities at that point. By Proposition 4, this ratio is equal
to the ratio of the disagreement utilities.
6 A comparative analysis
In this section, we clarify our theory by contrasting it to the most related literature.
i) Endogenous determination of the disagreement point.
In his 1953 paper, Nash proposed a generalization of his original model of 1950.
In this game, known as the “variable threat” model of bargaining, the players choose
threats before the actual bargaining phase, of which they serve as the disagreement
point. At first blush, our model may seem just like Nash’s one, with a specific, well-
motivated threat game (like Anbarci et al. 2002). Actually, however, our contribution
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goes well beyond that. There are two important differences between the models that
we would like to underline:
a) Nash needs to employ an “umpire” to oblige the players to carry out their
threats (in case of disagreement). We do without a n + 1st party. The underlying
reason for this is quite relevant. Nash thinks of the threat phase as one preceding
the Nash bargaining game. Therefore, this phase has no interpretation on its own,
it is simply a — perhaps realistic — way to make the bargaining game more detailed.
In contrast, we think of our conflict subgame as one posterior to bargaining. By
invoking sequential rationality, we can then analyze the players’ optimal behavior
in that subgame without any additional ommitment device. Apart from the obvious
difference in philosophy, the technical difference is also apparent, since in Nash’s game
by a well-chosen threat (which she would prefer not to carry out) a player can improve
her share, without her bluff ever being called. Thus, even if we used our conflict game
as the threat game, the equilibria would differ, since the players, in general, would
not use a threat that forms part of an equilibrium of the conflict game.
b)When Nash’s players generate a disagreement point, he considers the bargaining
problem properly defined and proceeds to its solution (according to his 1950 paper).
In contrast, we argue that they have simply arrived at a new bargaining situation,
where they might wish to employ different threats than before. To put it another
way: while in the Nash model the demand phase depends on the outcome of the
threat phase, in our model the conflict game is supposed to depend on the demands
made (when they are not compatible).
ii) Step-by-step resolution.
Kalai (1977) introduced the axiom of decomposability. This assumption requires
that if we break up the set of available agreements, S, into two subsets, X and Y ,
then using the solution of (either) one of these as a partial agreement to subsequently
bargain over the rest, (S − f (X, d))
⋂
ℜN+ , should give the same result as applying
the solution directly. Note that Kalai’s model agrees with ours in the idea that partial
agreements are only renegotiated if this yields a Pareto improvement. On the other
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hand, Kalai does not propose a well-defined solution: he only establishes that the
solution should be “proportional,” without identifying what should these proportions
be. In addition, Kalai’s model has two caveats, first pointed out by Ponsati and
Watson (1997). The first of these is that when agreeing on the first sub-problem,
the bargainers of Kalai are not supposed to take into account the effect of today’s
agreement on tomorrow’s one.This is not true in our model. Second,there seems to be
an inconsistency between the assumption that the agreement on the first subproblem
is binding, but at the same time can be renegotiated —since the second sub-problem
is not S\X = Y but (S − f (X, d))
⋂
ℜN+ . In our model, however, these two sets
coincide so we avoid any confusion.
Wiener and Winter (1999) (see O’Neill et al., 2004 for the published version) pro-
pose a solution for bargaining problems where the feasible set is exogenously divided
up into smaller pieces. Their solution is equivalent to agreeing step-by-step on each
“crumb” according to the Nash solution, using the result of the previous step as the
new disagreement point. This procedure is similar to ours, but we use the disagree-
ment function to determine the new status quo and we do not need the arbitrary
division.
Fearon (1996) proposes a model with flow payoffs where the current distribution
of the assets determines the current power in case of (costly) conflict. Assuming
one-sided offers, he obtains a unique path of gradually increasing demand.
iii) Bargaining under the threat of some outside enforcement mechanism.
This topic has been extensively dealt with in the applied literature (pre-trial ne-
gotiations, strikes, arbitration etc.). Perhaps, the piece closest to our approach is
Powell (1996). Powell sets up a non-cooperative bargaining game where the players
can choose to force a (probabilistic) settlement at some cost. The important dif-
ference with respect to our approach is that, in his model, forcing the settlement is
equivalent to taking an outside option. However, outside options do not determine,
in general, the outcome of a bargaining game. Therefore, Powell needs to rely on the
solution to the bargaining game, which would come about in the absence of outside
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options. In our case, in contrast, the solution of the game cannot be dissociated from
the underlying conflict situation.
iv) Recursive solutions.
We are not the first ones to use a recursive application of some rule in bargaining
theory. Let us mention just a couple. Raiffa (1953) proposes a method where the
players first pocket half of their most preferred allocation, then half of their most
preferred allocation in the remainder... etc. While in (its recursive) structure his
procedure is very much like ours, the important difference is that he has no justi-
fication other than some vague consideration of “fairness”for the fifty ercent rule.
van Damme (1986) considers a ecursivity axiom, which imposes that if the players
are making demands according to some individual theories, then in every step of the
iteration, as a function of these demands some subset of S is to be discarded, and the
negotiation resumed. Technically, the IIIA assumption is very similar, with the im-
portant difference that we only invoke individual rationality for discarding “irrelevant
alternatives.”
v) Disagreement modelled as a non-cooperative game.
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) replace divorce by a non-cooperative equilibrium
within marriage, as the disagreement point in a model of marital bargaining. While
they implicitly recognize that the forces determining the threat point are the same
ones that influence the bargaining process, they do not make this connection explicit,
and simply use the Nash solution.
vi) Endogenous bargaining power.
Spindler (1974, 1976) proposed a definition of bargaining power which is not fixed,
rather it is a function of the agreement considered (and of the status quo). Then the
solution can be calculated as the one which equates these endogenous bargaining
powers. While his method is very different from hours, it shares the idea of trying to
read more out of the bargaining situation than Nash’s bargaining set.
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a new approach to the theory of negotiation and
have introduced the corresponding agreement concept. The cornerstone of our theory
is the more efficient use of information that was already necessary for the standard
theory: the description of the non-cooperative resolution of conflict. Indeed, we use
not only the utility allocation in a particular equilibrium (the disagreement point),
but we make full use of the primitives behind this equilibrium. In fact, we have
shown that — provided it is non-trivial — the disagreement function contains sufficient
information to derive a unique agreement when coupled with a mild generalization of
individual rationality.
We consider our theory to be complementary to the one based on time preferences.
In scenarios where delay costs (and the risk of breakdown) are negligible with respect
to the stakes of negotiation, like political disputes; or where disagreement leads into
conflict which generates inefficiencies that are not related to delay, our approach seems
to be more appropriate. In addition, the ASC solution yields a unique solution for an
arbitrary number of negotiators, while the alternating-offers models usually generate
multiple equilibria for more than two players.
Our theory carries with it a conceptual novelty as well. This insight relates to
the interpretation of the terms: agreement and disagreement. Recall that the general
idea of offer-counteroffer models is that disagreement is temporary — in the sense that
the rejection of an offer does not end the negotiation — and that agreement is total
— in the sense that at each point in time the players are either in agreement or not,
no intermediate possibility is considered. Instead, we make the “dual” assumption:
we posit that disagreement is final but possibly partial, while agreements can be
temporary, and therefore partial as well. That is, we allow for the possibility that
the players agree on the sharing of part of the surplus and either postpone agreement
or disagree on the rest. The important observation is that the fact that they did
not get to full agreement is not interpreted as a complete failure of the negotiation:
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the partial agreement can be implemented and the extent (and the efficiency cost) of
disagreement is reduced.
To appreciate the degree of the meta-similarity of the dual approaches, note that
our enrichment of the bargaining problem with the disagreement function merely cor-
responds to the incorporation of an exogenous cost of disagreement — over the surplus
remaining, conditional on any partial agreement. This is completely parallel to the
case where the description of the bargaining problem is augmented with the exoge-
nous parameters of the cost of (temporary) disagreement to each party — following
any length of past disagreement. Similarly, our ruling out of a trivial disagreement
game corresponds to Rubinstein’s ruling out perfectly patient players. Finally, in both
cases the sequential story behind the solution is not meant to be actually followed
in real time. Rational, fully informed agents will immediately identify which is the
unique solution.
Finally, we should emphasize that we have presented our model based on cardinal
preferences only to minimize our departure from standard theory. It is easy to see
that we need not restrict attention to the utility space in order to derive our solution.
Any underlying space of bargaining outcomes, together with a complete preference
relation, would suffice. In other words, our theory is one based on ordinal preferences,
an elusive16 goal for solutions to the standard bargaining problem.
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